Who is arming the lra

But, after the signing of the Nairobi peace pact, both countries officially renounced supporting each others' rebels. Sudan vehemently denies the fresh accusations, pointing out that the Sudanese government has made efforts to help Uganda crush the insurgency. It is mere propaganda by those with an interest in derailing the peace process between the two governments. When we took action to help Uganda fight the LRA, it was a clear commitment.

The conclusion of its report accusing the Sudanese army of secretly supplying the Ugandan rebels was based on interviews with "six different returnees from the LRA" who had come out under amnesty in the months between February and June this year. All had been with the LRA for at least seven to 10 years and had held positions from sergeant to major.

The ARLPI says the interviews were conducted separately in places cut off from anyone else and without the interviewees knowing that similar questions were being asked of their companions. From these independent sources, the report concludes that, "members of the Sudanese armed forces have been delivering truckloads of military assistance to the LRA in Nsitu [southern Sudan] since October ".

Sudan says such eyewitness accounts are unreliable. Some southerners accuse northern politicians opposed to the south's independence of arming the LRA but this has been denied in Khartoum. LRA leader Joseph Kony began his rebellion 20 years ago, claiming to want to install a Bible-based theocracy in Uganda. In , he was about to sign a peace deal, negotiated by Southern Sudan, but at the last minute he refused to lay down his arms.

In May, the US passed legislation requiring Washington to come up with a strategy to work with regional governments to protect civilians from LRA attacks. South Sudan LRA rebel raids rise. In pictures: Vigilante villagers take on roaming rebels. Behind the LRA's terror tactics. In the weeks after the 1 February coup, as the Tatmadaw began its campaign to quash protest and other dissent, many communities and groups of protesters across Myanmar began forming militias to protect themselves from regime violence and launch an armed resistance.

Hide Footnote Some such groups have emerged over the last six months and are carrying out regular attacks on regime targets. For a detailed analysis, including numbers of militia groups and their geographical distribution, see Matthew B.

Hide Footnote Although numbers are difficult to verify, the NUG claimed in September that popular resistance forces and ethnic armed groups had killed 1, regime troops over the preceding three months. Hide Footnote Some of these are working closely with — and being trained by — ethnic armed groups. Hide Footnote All the resistance groups rely predominantly on asymmetric warfare tactics, including:.

Resistance forces have been killing several people per day in recent months, including regime-appointed local administrators, USDP members, security force personnel and alleged informants known as dalan in Burmese.

The regime claims that, as of 9 September, the resistance had murdered such individuals since the coup and injured another in assassination attempts — numbers that are broadly consistent with Crisis Group tallies compiled from independent media reports. Hide Footnote On 30 August, for example, an assailant shot dead a village tract administrator in his home in Taungtha township, near Mandalay. Hide Footnote The junta had appointed the administrator two months earlier. A local anti-regime militia, the Taungtha Guerilla Task Force, claimed responsibility for the killing.

Improvised explosive devices. Since early April, there have been hundreds of explosions across Myanmar. The regime claims a total of 2, such attacks between 1 February and 9 September. Hide Footnote While some of these incidents have gone unclaimed, the targets and the methods used suggest that anti-regime forces carried out the vast majority. Hide Footnote Targets include government and local administration offices and houses, businesses owned by or seen as supportive of the military, homes or businesses of alleged informants, public places such as city intersections , and police and military posts.

Hide Footnote In the lead-up to the school year, which began on 1 June, parties unknown planted bombs at schools — in some cases apparently to support an education boycott and in others to attack troops posted or billeted at schools. Drive-by shootings and ambushes. As underground resistance cells have gained better training, mostly from ethnic armed groups, and managed to supplement their makeshift arsenals with more modern firearms, they have been conducting more deadly attacks on security forces.

In various cities, militants have killed policemen and soldiers manning security posts and checkpoints in drive-by shootings. Hide Footnote In rural areas, resistance forces have regularly hit military convoys with roadside bombs, including as part of complex attacks where fighters follow the explosions with small arms fire, causing double-digit death tolls.

Hide Footnote There have also been a few similar attacks in urban areas. On 9 September, for example, a resistance group threw a bomb into a passing army truck in downtown Yangon, and then engaged in a shootout with surviving soldiers; a major and a private were reportedly killed, and several other troops injured.

Sabotage of critical infrastructure. Resistance groups have also been targeting economic, communications and transport infrastructure deemed important to the regime. They have sabotaged more than cell phone towers since June, most of which were used by MyTel, a company partly owned by the military. State media also reported 68 such attacks up to 9 September. Crisis Group has logged reports of some 60 attacks since then.

Hide Footnote Resistance groups have also hit electricity transmission towers, bridges and railway lines. Hide Footnote All these targets are soft and dispersed, making them difficult for the regime to guard effectively. Decisions on who or what constitutes a legitimate target, and what methods and tactics are appropriate, are in the hands of the individual resistance groups, who lack experience or clear criteria for making such judgments. Recognising that abuses could discredit the resistance movement, the NUG has issued guidance, in the form of a brief set of ethical rules in May, followed by one page of disciplinary rules in September.

The NUG human rights ministry also appealed to armed groups, in particular the Tatmadaw, not to hurt civilians in the course of their operations. Hide Footnote The NUG has no command and control over resistance groups, however, and no obvious way of enforcing compliance. In any case, the rules it laid out are very general, with no explanation of how militants should apply them in real-world situations.

Resistance forces have staged a number of problematic attacks and sometimes failed to prevent harm to bystanders. In these cases, it is rare for any group to admit responsibility. On 25 May, for example, a parcel bomb disguised as a present exploded at the wedding of a well-known nationalist who had reportedly participated in pro-Tatmadaw rallies. He was unharmed, but his bride, cousin and another distant relative were killed while three more people, including two children, were injured.

Hide Footnote In another example, a bomb that exploded on 14 September in front of the USDP office in Magway town killed a five-year-old child and wounded two other passers-by. Hide Footnote Targeting alleged informants carries obvious risks of misidentification or other mishap: in some cases, militants might be acting upon personal grudges or misinformation from third parties.

The junta may be able to insulate itself and its security apparatus from major hardship, but the implications for the population are devastating. Hide Footnote The World Bank has estimated that the economy will shrink by 18 per cent in the fiscal year to September The economic crisis is compounded by the fact that the coping mechanisms Myanmar people typically resort to when faced with economic difficulties, such as rural-urban migration and emigration overseas, are no longer available.

Formal sources of employment have dried up, with a collapse in manufacturing, tourism, hospitality, construction and other sectors leading to 1. Hide Footnote Women have been disproportionately hurt due in particular to the impact on the garment industry, which employs mostly young women. Hide Footnote Border closures and slow economic recovery in destination countries, particularly Thailand, means that heading abroad to work is not feasible. Hide Footnote The damage to livelihoods has been extreme, with the number of people in poverty estimated to have doubled since , and around half of households unable to afford sufficient food.

Doctors and nurses have been at the forefront of protests and public-sector strikes known as the Civil Disobedience Movement. Hide Footnote The security forces have targeted medical staff, emergency responders and private clinics with violence, with the World Health Organization reporting such attacks across the country.

Hide Footnote The resulting blow to the health-care system has coincided with — and greatly exacerbated — a wave of COVID that has killed thousands since July. Hide Footnote The collapse, combined with a general loss of public trust in regime-controlled services, has also severely disrupted routine childhood immunisation, as well as testing and treatment for communicable diseases including malaria, tuberculosis and HIV — putting many lives at risk and threatening a setback to global efforts to combat these illnesses.

The announcement of the new structure came in Order No. There was a minor reshuffle of ministers at the same time, and some ministries were split apart, reversing changes made by the government in power before the coup.

In the same 1 August speech, Min Aung Hlaing announced that elections would be held and power transferred by 1 August — presumably with him as civilian president. If Min Aung Hlaing does craft an outcome where he is president, under the constitution he would have to retire from the military. Hide Footnote While the coup itself was unconstitutional, this extended period is longer than the two-year maximum for a state of emergency set out in the constitutional provision that the junta invoked to justify the military takeover.

It now seems clear that the military intends to refashion the electoral landscape to ensure a result amenable to what it perceives as its interests. In detention since the coup, Aung San Suu Kyi, the year-old former head of government, faces a raft of charges that could see her sentenced to up to 75 years of prison. Hide Footnote The regime-appointed election commission has suggested that the state will dissolve her National League for Democracy party, which won the November polls with 82 per cent of the elected seats, due to unsupported allegations of fraud.

Hide Footnote This change would seem to require altering the constitution, requiring a referendum, but the regime-appointed election commission has recently stated that no constitutional amendment is needed. The regime has shown no inclination toward dialogue as a way out of the crisis that the country is facing. Hide Footnote Rather, the regime is attempting to use violence and intimidation to bring the country to heel.

It appears determined to crush the resistance as quickly as possible and move ahead with its political roadmap without compromise. Through mass arrests and interrogations, it appears to have improved its intelligence on its adversaries, leading to a number of arrests in September that have disrupted resistance cells, although to what degree is unclear. While Myanmar state media reports must be treated with extreme caution, Crisis Group interviews with individuals close to three of these cases suggest that the regime has disrupted active underground networks in those cases.

In any case, a shift from direct military rule to an elected pro-military government with Min Aung Hlaing as president would do little to assuage public anger or placate the resistance movement. Despite its efforts to quash dissent and apply a veneer of legitimacy to its rule, the military is likely to face more resistance, both non-violent and violent.

While the regime is focused on repression and rolling out its political roadmap, resistance forces continue their efforts to disrupt these plans and deny the junta the ability to rule.

Locally organised networks, some of which are cooperating closely with ethnic armed groups, are carrying most of this load. Hide Footnote Since then, resistance activities have continued to expand in some areas, but have not escalated dramatically nationwide. The NUG hopes to develop its military and bureaucratic capabilities to be able to control territory and administer populations, but so far these aims remain aspirational.

These announcements are therefore more about projecting legitimacy than actual governance. See, for example, the Future of Myanmar Students page. It was not the first instance when the parallel administration publicly backed violent resistance.