However, the determination of consensus is related to the views of the Imams, and more freedom is given to analogy than in Sunni Islam Nasr , Sunni Muslims strongly believe that the redemption of human beings is dependent on faith in Allah, His prophets, acceptance of Muhammad as the final prophet, and belief in righteous deeds as explained in the Koran.
The mercy of Allah will determine the redemption of all human beings. Even the prophet Muhammad is at the mercy of Allah. There are many other verses in the Koran which enumerate that the basis of paradise is the mercy of Allah and the righteous deeds of human beings according to the Koran and Hadith. Shiite Muslims are guaranteed paradise if they obey and follow Muhammad and the Twelve Imams. They are considered righteous Muslims, and the Twelve Imams are particularly respected because of their relationship to Ali and his wife Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad.
Sunnis believe that Ali and his two sons, Hassan and Hussain, were highly respected by the first three Caliphs and the companions of Muhammad. Any righteous and knowledgeable Sunni Muslim can serve as an Imam with the prime function of leading the prayers and interpreting the Koran and Hadith provided he is well versed in these subjects. Sunnis also consider it heretical to impute to human beings attributes of Divine nature such as infallibility and the knowledge of all temporal and cosmic matters.
The highest ranking present-day Imams Ayatollahs are believed to receive their guidance and spiritual enlightenment directly from the "Twelve Imams," who stay in continuous contact with their followers on earth every day through contemporary spiritual leaders. The Ayatollahs thus play a vital mediatory role. Because of their spiritual role, Ayatollahs cannot be appointed by governments, but only by consensus of other Ayatollahs.
Differences in Religious Organization The differences between Sunni and Shiite Islam are more than theological and historical. They are embedded in the social and political structure of the Middle East. Sunnis and Shiites form distinct communities. Conversions from Shiism to Sunnism and vice versa are rare, and Sunnis and Shiites are expected to marry members of their own community. The vital moments of life-marriage, birth, and death-are commemorated within the framework of the rituals of the community.
Members of each community learn about Islam within the traditions of their own faith, and under the guidance of their faith's religious teachers. Despite these traditions, the political loyalties of Sunnis and Shiites are affected by their country of citizenship and nationality. In , Iran, a Shiite country whose language and culture are Farsi Persian , was invaded by Iraq, an Arab country with a Sunni leadership but a Shiite majority in the population.
Despite Iranian appeals, most Iraqi Shiites remained loyal to Iraq, performing military service when required during the Iran-Iraq war. Both Sunni and Shiite Islam are organized in ways that reflect their beliefs. In view of the emphasis of mainstream Shiism on the role of the Imamate, it is not surprising that the Shiites have a more elaborate religious hierarchy than Sunni Muslims.
With the exception of post-revolutionary Iran, the Shiite clergy has been more independent of the government than religious officials have been in Sunni Muslim countries. Shiite religious officials have had less need to rely on secular governments for money to finance their activities, since they control substantial religious endowments.
In the Shiite communities, the most important appointments to senior religious positions are made by Shiite religious officials, not by the state. In Sunni countries, in contrast, it is typical for governments to exercise control over the appointment of senior religious officials. These governments have also assumed the right to allocate large religious endowments through government ministries created for that purpose. This makes high-ranking Sunni clergy more dependent on the government than their Shiite counterparts.
Sunnis are also more open than Shiites to the idea that the leading of prayers and preaching can be done by lay persons without formal clerical training.
In view of the power of the Shiite clergy, it is not surprising that they play an important political role. Led by the Ayatollah Khomeini, the clergy organized the revolution that overthrew the Shah of Iran in and turned the country into an Islamic Republic.
Shiite clergy have also been prominent in opposition movements in Iraq and Lebanon. Islamic Political Movements Both Shiite and Sunni Muslim political movements have as a primary objective the establishment of Islamic law as the sole basis of government.
They reject secularism as an imported western idea, and are opposed to several kinds of social change that use the west as a model, such as changes in the status of women.
Political movements with a religious message have a popular appeal in many Muslim countries. This is partly because of the religious outlook of the people. But it is also because the leaders of these movements are addressing the political issues of the day. One of the reasons for the fall of the Shah of Iran was that his secularizing policies alienated the religious establishment.
In contrast, the monarchs of oil-rich Sunni Muslim countries have made a greater effort to keep their policies in line with religious sensitivities. Another very important reason for the fall of the Shah was the widespread discontent with his development policies favoring rich and westernized groups. The Shah spent a great deal of the country's oil wealth on military and civilian projects thought by many to be poorly conceived.
Iran was a more populous country than other oil-rich Middle Eastern states, so its oil wealth spread less widely among the people. The effect of the Shah's westernizing development policies was to produce a new bourgeois class that was a target of hatred and resentment for poor people. In addition, like nationalist and leftist Iranian parties, the clergy vehemently attacked the Shah's ties to the West. In spite of their religious orientation, many of the issues addressed by the Islamic movements are the same political or social issues that concern secular politicians.
The movements attack government corruption and the gulf between rich and poor. In Iraq and Lebanon, where Shiite communities are poorer than the Sunni and Christian communities, resentment at perceived discrimination has also allowed Shiite movements to mobilize grassroots support.
Problems of corruption and poverty are also invoked by Sunni movements in countries such as Egypt and Algeria, though these movements have so far not been able to obtain support from high-level religious leaders of a stature comparable to the Ayatollah Khomeini before the Iranian revolution.
The opposition to the West is derived from historic resentment in many parts of the Muslim world at western colonialism earlier this century. In addition to problems arising from that period, a number of more recent American and western policies are often cited by Muslim movements: western attempts to incorporate Muslim countries in alliances against the Soviet Union during the Cold War; political interventions such as the CIA-backed coup d'etat of that restored the Shah after a nationalist government led by Mohammed Mossadegh had taken power in Iran; western military and political support for Israel against the Arab world; and western military and political support for unrepresentative governments.
Some of the most dramatic anti-western acts have been carried out by Shiite political groups in Lebanon, where the central government collapsed following the outbreak of civil war in The fighting led to foreign intervention by Syrian, Israeli, and American forces. Radical Shiite movements such as the Hizballah "Party of God" flourished in the period following the dramatic western military intervention in Lebanon in , when Israeli troops expelled the PLO from Beirut, and American peace-keeping forces were sent to Lebanon to be withdrawn in Militant Shiites taking advantage of the lack of a central authority in the country attacked western and Israeli targets, and took hostages, some of whom were killed.
Sunni opposition movements in Egypt and Algeria have also recently been increasingly violent in their anti-government, anti-western tactics.
These tactics have caused a major debate in the Islamic world. There is no justification in Islamic scriptures and jurisprudence for indiscriminate killings or assassinations of local or foreign citizens by either Sunni or Shiite Muslims.
Many intellectuals, however, cite the shortcomings of governments as a reason for these acts. Violent anti-civilian acts are not Islamic in origin. In fact, radical violence seems to be a worldwide phenomenon. Radical groups, whether religious or not, often flourish in non-democratic environments where injustice, repression, and inappropriate foreign influence are widely believed to be dominant characteristics of the existing order. Notes 1. The majority of the Iraqi population consists of Arab Shiites, but Sunni Arabs form a large minority group in the country.
According to the well-known jurist, Al-Shaf'i, Ijma is the third source of Islamic jurisprudence. References Bayat, M. Mysticism and Dissent. Donaldson, M. Ismaeel, S. Khateeb, M. Broad Aspects of Shi'ite Religion. Riyadh: National Offset Printing Press, Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhallah. Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, Kohlberg, E. Nasr, S. Tabatabai, S. Shi'ite Islam. The shared values that unite Ismailis are centred on their allegiance to a living Imam. The authority and guidance of the Imam provides the enabling framework for the development of the Ismaili community and for the continuity of its Muslim heritage.
The modern phase of Nizari Ismaili history, as with other Muslims, can be dated to the 19th century and to the significant historical changes arising from the growth and enlargement of European presence and power in the Muslim world.
His leadership enabled the community in India to lay the foundations for institutional and social developments and also fostered more regular contacts with Ismaili communities in other parts of the world. He also played an important role representing Muslims in the emerging political institutions under British rule in India. Aga Khan III was Imam for 72 years, the longest in Ismaili history, and his life spanned dramatic political, social and economic transformations.
His long-term involvement in international affairs, his advocacy of Muslim interests in troubled times, and his commitment to the advancement of education, particularly for Muslim women, reflect his significant and generous contributions.
It was his leadership as Imam, however, that transformed the modern history of the Nizari Ismailis, enabling them to adapt successfully to the challenges of the 20th century. In South Asia and Africa, the Nizari Ismailis established administrative strutures, eductional institutions, and health services, and built on economic opportunities in trade and industry.
In , the Nizari Ismaili community in East Africa adopted a constitution, which laid the basis for an organised framework of institutions and governance at local, regional and national levels. The revised Ismaili constitution, which serves the social governance needs of all Nizari Ismailis, facilitates a unified approach to internal organisation and external relations, while taking account of regional diversity and local differences. As in the past, Ismailis follow a strong tradition of voluntary service, contributions, and donations of time, expertise, and personal resources to the Imam and communal institutions.
The present Nizari Imam assumed his post in , at a time when much of the developing world, including the Muslim world, was going through an important period of transition, often marked by political change and upheaval.
These continued throughout the 20th century, making it particularly vital that the Ismailis were guided appropriately through periods of crises and tumultuous changes, as in East Africa and the subcontinent, and later in Tajikistan, Iran, Syria and Afghanistan.
While the internal institutional organisations of the Nizari Ismaili community continued to be strengthened and reorganised to respond to changing conditions, the Imam also created new institutions to better serve the complex development needs of the community and the societies in which his followers lived. This gave rise to the establishment of the AKDN Aga Khan Development Network with the goal of creating strategies for sustainable human development conducive to the fulfilment of the cultural, economic, social, and spiritual aspirations of individuals and communities.
A number of institutions within the AKDN pursue a variety of programmes in economic development, education social development, culture, and the environment across the world, in both rural and urban settings, with a particular emphasis on disadvantaged populations.
Neither the exoteric zahir nor the esoteric batin aspect of the religion obliterates the other. The Imamate thus enables believers to go beyond the apparent or outward form of the revelation in their search for its inner spirituality and meaning.
Both communities, accordingly, subscribe to the fundamentals of Islam and its core practices. For many centuries, a prominent feature of the religious landscape of Islam has been gathering spaces that coexist in harmony with the mosque.
The resulting diversity ofthese practices corresponds to the multiple cultural, linguistic, and literary traditions of the Nizari Ismailis, which reflects the pluralism of the of the MuslimUmmawithin the fundamental unity of Islam.
This unity among Muslims has historically coexisted with the right of each school of Islamic thought to practice its particular interpretation of the central tenets of Islam. He lives in Mumbai Bombay , where the leadership has moved from its earlier headquarters in Gujarat. Following the annexation of the province of Najran from the Yemen to Saudi Arabia in , a smaller community of Sulaymanis is also to be found there with a much smaller number in India.
Sayyidna Muhammad has continued to emphasise the strong tradition of learning in the Daudi community. There are well-establishedmadrasasfor the religious education of all Daudi Bohras as well as schools for secular education. The tradition of retaining the heritage of learning through manuscript study has been well preserved, and scholarly and literary works, primarily in Arabic, continue to be developed within the community.
The majority of Ismaili Bohras are in business and industry and have a well-deserved reputation for entrepreneurship and public service. The Sulaymani community is of predominantly Arab origin and lives mostly in Yemen.
It is found in both urban and rural areas, with strong tribal roots. The Sulaymani community of Najran in Saudi Arabia has often found it difficult to practice its faith openly and freely because of pressure from the official Wahhabi sect of Saudi Arabia.
The much smaller Sulaymani community in India has produced noted public officials and scholars. There are certain differences between the traditions and the social practices of the Arabic-speaking Yemeni Sulaymanis and the Daudis of South Asia, who use a form of the Gujarati written in Arabic script.
The Daudi Bohras have also incorporated many Hindu customs in their marriage and other ceremonies. Yahya was eventually tracked down by the Umayyads and killed in CE. By the middle of the 9th century CE, the Zaydis shifted their attention away from Iraq and concentrated their activities in regions far removed from the centres of Abbasid power. These regions included Daylam , in northern Iran, and Yemen, where two Zaydi states were soon founded.
The Zaydis did not recognise a hereditary line of Imams, nor did they attach any significance to the principle of designation, nass.
According to Zaydi doctrine, if an Imam wished to be recognised, he would have to assert his claims publicly in an uprising khuruj , in addition to having the required religious knowledge. Many Zaydi Imams were learned scholars and authors.
In contrast to the Twelvers and the Ismailis, the Zaydis excluded underage males from the Imamate. They alsorejected the eschatological idea of a concealed Mahdi and his expected return.
However, the Zaydis developed the doctrine of hijra ,the obligation to emigrate from a land dominated by unjust, non-Zaydi rulers. However, this designation was unclear and obscure, so that its intended meaning could be understood only through investigation.
Religious knowledge, the ability to render independent rulings ijtihad , and piety were emphasised as the qualifications of the Imam. The list of the Zaydi Imams has never been completely fixed, although many of them were unanimously accepted by their followers. There were, in fact, periods without any Zaydi Imam, and at times, there was more than one Imam. In law, the Zaydis initially relied on the teachings of Zayd b.
By the end of the 9th century, however, four legal schools had emerged on the basis of the teachings of different Zaydi scholars, including Imam al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim al-Rassi d. In CE, Hasan b. Subsequently, the Daylami Zaydis were divided into two rival factions, the Qasimiyya and the Nasiriyya. There was much antagonism between the two Zaydi communities of northern Iran who often supported different leaders.
Matters were further complicated by ethnic differences and the close ties that existed between the Qasimiyya Zaydis and the Zaydis of Yemen. Subsequently, the Zaydis were further weakened because of incessant factional quarrels among different pretenders.
The descendants of al-Hadi eventually quarreled among themselves and failed to be acknowledged as Imams, thus undermining Zaydi rule in the Yemen. In the 11th century, the Yemeni Zaydis experienced further problems because of schismatic movements in their community.
The Zaydi Imamate was briefly restored in the Yemen by Ahmad b. The Yemeni Zaydis were at times obliged to develop better relations with the Sunnis against their own doctrines.
In later centuries, as the Zaydi Imams extended their rule to the predominantly Sunni lowlands of Yemen, the Zaydis attempted to achieve a certain doctrinal rapport with their Sunni subjects. On the other hand, the Yemeni Zaydis maintained their traditional hostility toward the Sufis, even though a Zaydi school of Sufism was founded in Yemen in the 14th century. The Zaydis also had prolonged conflicts with the Yemeni Ismailis and wrote numerous polemical treatises in refutation of Ismaili doctrines.
The later Qasimi-Zaydi Imams ruled over Yemen on a purely dynastic basis until , although they still claimed the title of Imam. Albany, New York, Cole, Juan. London, Keddie, N. New Haven, Leiden, The Netherlands: E. Lieden, The Netherlands: E. Momen, Moojan. An Introduction to Shiite Islam. Nanji, Azim. Little, ed. Leiden, , pp. Fyzee, revised by I. Poonawala, asThe Pillars of Islam. New Delhi, Sachedina, Abdulaziz.
Serjeant, R. Arberry, ed. Cambridge, , vol. Abd al-Karim. Kazi and J. Flynn asMuslim Sects and Divisions. Muhammad Husayn. Wellhausen, Julius. Ostle and S. Amsterdam, Vincent J. Cornell published by Praeger in The historical formation of the worldwide Muslim community or Umma Academic Article. What is Shi'a Islam? The Nizari Ismailis The seat of the Nizari Imamate moved to Iran, where the Ismailis had already succeeded, under the leadership of Hasan-i Sabbah, in establishing a state comprising a network of fortified settlements.
Bibliography Akhavi, Shahrokh. Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran. Algar, Hamid. Religion and State in Iran. Berkeley, Paris, Arendonk, C. Leiden, Arjomand, Said A. Ayoub, Mahmoud. Redemptive Suffering in Islam. The Hague, Blank, Jonah. Chicago, Corbin, Henry.
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